

Friday, 31 August

Acting

1. See attached resume of telephone conversations between General Carter and Mr. Bundy, General Lemnitzer, Mr. Harvey and Mr. Hilsman.
2. Called McGeorge Bundy and General Lemnitzer with information that the readout of the last U-2 flight over Cuba showed SA-2 sites.

Received call from the President about 1300, asking how many people were told of this information. I said it has been handled in regular channels. The President said to put it back in the box and nail it tight; also to call General Lemnitzer to that effect. I followed these instructions. Also told Cline to put clamps on. (This freeze continued until Saturday, 1 September, when information was extended further to the analysts so as to advise the President better.

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TELECONS -- 31 August

0845 - General Carter to Mr. Bundy

Gen. C: The preliminary readout on the pictures we took yesterday and the day before yesterday indicate that there are seven SA-2 sites being put in and a couple of PT bases going in.

B: Anything that would suggest submarines? How far along is it?

C: They are just beginning to clear out.

0850 - General Carter to General Lemnitzer

General Carter gave General Lemnitzer same info as above.

Gen. L: You think your people will be calling for one of those things we were talking about yesterday?

Gen. C: Yes, but I don't know when. Probably in the next day or two.

Gen. L: The only problem is State.

Gen. C: That was sort of an unanswered thing, wasn't it? That other show was approved. He (Taylor?) said there was no problem on the 101s but I am sure he meant the other area.

Gen. L: It will take some preliminary work for us to set it up.

0855 -- General Carter to Mr. Harvey

Gen. C: We should take a reading on the current intelligence -- it looks like everybody has got a hair up their ~~tail~~ tail)

H: It may be a preview on what we had planned. . . . We are going to send one in from down South. I still don't have a full reading from the Navy on planning??.

1250 -- The President to General Carter (see separate transcript.)

Little later - General Carter to General Lemnitzer

General Carter told General Lemnitzer that the President had called and "was a little exercised about the number of people who might be informed of that information I gave you this morning. It came through the _____ channels. the highest classification we have. etc etc."

31 August - 3:30

General Lemnitzer to General Carter

L: I understand you have seen this Flash report. It has got some factors in it that even goes beyond. Wanted to be sure that you told State and Bundy.

C: I talked to [] and Bundy himself. I think we are trapped on our call from the President.

Mr. Harvey to General Carter

5:30 -- We briefed the Attorney General for about 30 minutes with with photographs and full information... Lundahl and his shop and as far as I can tell it went well and was very satisfactory. The Attorney General was quite serious -- did not ask to keep any of the material and handed it back. I asked him if he wanted to see anything further. He then asked me to stay afterward . . . talked about the situation generally, asked about the operation we discussed last night. Hopes to leave for Hyannis.

5:35 -- Mr. Hilsman to General Carter

H: How did your conversation come out with MacNamara?

C: I don't know, I told him about the []

H: I think there is a great risk it is going to come out. People are going to say these things as your [] illustrates and I think it is going to make the President look blind. C: The other thing that you can't operate very effectively with half the people who have a need to know not doing their jobs. There is not a thing to do over here and I have put a clamp on SSO channels and Lundahl's channels. We aren't putting it in intelligence estimates or bulletins or anything else.

H: People like me and you learn about this completely automatically.

Then what I had I knew. The first thing that happened was that I got a hold of [] and he said get a hold of the Secretary right away. So I called [] and he told the Secretary ///

C: . . . he said he wanted to get this thing nailed right back in the box.

H: It is going to come out - not through the leaks in the U. S. Government and because of that what he has to do is -- he doesn't have to have an answer if he schedules a special NSC meeting tomorrow.....

C: Does Dean know the problems we are having?

H: Yes, I have told him.

C: I don't know - this is a matter of at least politics as much as anything else right now.

TELECONS - 1 September

1050 --Secretary Gilpatric to General Carter

G: I am concerned about the clamp which the President put on the Press.

C: So am I, and

G: We have got to go ahead and instruct Col. Steakley and go ahead with the normal processing of that. We have got to be in a position to brief the President at least on Tuesday. No people involved must be kept at _____ within the Presidential guidance. ~~XXX~~

25X1 C: [] and I agree we have got to get a full readout on what was taken. Thing is whether we shouldn't have some low altitude flights to really pinpoint... The President called . . .

G: He called me at 4:30.

C: (Read from transcript of telecon w/President) I called General Lemnitzer and told him that the President didn't want this discussed with anybody or any paper on it. There shouldn't be any paper or any translation in the intelligence community. He told me not to send out any copies of this to Secretary of Air or SAC . . .

G: Yes, no distribution nor circulation but what he told me just before he left which . . . was to get a military appropriation assessment on playing out what . . . the military standpoint . . . the equipment on

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